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 11 A Compendium of Safety Strategies and Interventions 
 The foundational ideas which have informed our thinking are essentially quite sim-
ple but hard won in the sense that they are not for the most part embedded in current 
thinking. We have argued that we need to view safety through the patient’s eyes and 
that safety needs to be approached very differently in the varying settings along the 
patient journey. This implies in turn that we need to think more explicitly about 
what kind of safety strategies are most useful in different contexts. We can now 
draw these themes together and consider the new directions that emerge. 
 In this chapter we fi rst review the ideas and arguments of the book and sum-
marise the transitions in patient safety that we believe are needed (Box  11.1 ). We 
then set out a compendium of safety and risk management strategies which can be 
selected, combined and customised to any healthcare setting. 
 Seeing Safety Through the Patient’s Eyes 
 Our current approach to patient safety, seen from the perspective of healthcare pro-
fessionals, assumes generally high quality healthcare punctuated by safety incidents 
and adverse events. This is a sincere vision in that professionals naturally assume 
that for the most part they are giving good care though they know that there are 
occasional lapses. In contrast we have endeavoured to see safety through the 
patient’s eyes. A patient may receive wonderful care during one hospital admission, 
 Box 11.1. Five Transitions for Patient Safety 
•  Understanding risk and harm through the patient’s eyes 
•  Assessing both benefi t and harm across episodes of care 
•  Patient safety as the management of risk over time 
•  Varying safety models dependent on context 
•  Using a wider range of safety strategies and interventions 
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followed by decline due to inadequate monitoring in the community which is later 
corrected and their health restored; our fi ve levels of care are a formalisation of 
these varying standards of care that are experienced along the patient journey. This 
is a vision of safety from the perspective of the patient, carer and family which is the 
reality we need to capture (Box  11.2 ). 
 Most people understand that all healthcare involves a degree of risk. The level of 
risk that is accepted must be outweighed by the expected benefi ts and should be 
openly expressed. Failures in the healthcare system will always occur to some 
degree but their consequences can be limited by honesty, transparency, early 
response and mitigation. We believe, though this could be formally researched, that 
this is the pragmatic view that most people take of their healthcare. Medicine 
reduces suffering and improves our lives in many ways but is necessarily limited in 
what it can achieve. What counts for us as patients is whether healthcare improves 
our lives overall and whether it lives up to our expectations both technically and in 
the manner in which the care is provided. The engagement and relationship with 
clinical staff is important in itself but also affects the overall assessment of whether 
the care has been benefi cial or harmful. 
 Considering Benefit and Harm Along the Patient Journey 
 Seeing safety through the patient’s eyes has the immediate consequence that we 
need to view safety along the patient journey. This means that we need to exam-
ine episodes of care and consider both risk and harm within an extended times-
cale. We can still of course examine specifi c incidents occurring at particular 
times and this remains a useful exercise. However such an approach will not 
identify all safety issues and it is not well adapted to either understanding or 
improving safety in community settings. This longer term approach has conse-
quences for the measurement of harm, for methods of analysis and of course for 
safety interventions. 
 Box 11.2. Seeing Safety Through the Patient’s Eyes 
•  Isolated errors and incidents are generally less important than the overall 
coordination of care and the avoidance of major lapses. 
•  Coordination of care acquires a much greater importance as a safety issue. 
•  Patients with multiple problems face major challenges in coordinating 
their own care which can be a considerable burden and source of anxiety. 
•  Safety interventions to support patients at home will need to focus on 
organisational interventions such as rapid response to crises and coordina-
tion between agencies. 
•  The healthcare system needs to give more attention to the perspective of 
patients and families in monitoring and maintaining safety. 
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 The measurement of harm has previously focused on examining the incidence of 
specifi c adverse events. There is nothing wrong with such an approach; it provides 
important baseline information in particular settings which can be used to monitor 
certain types of harm. However these approaches will need to be extended to assess 
the balance of benefi t and harm over time for any one patient and eventually for 
populations of patients. Indicators of the reliability and overall quality of care across 
different healthcare settings might include reduction of repeated hospitalisation, 
time to response to problem, or the wider impact on work and family (Mountford 
and Davie  2010 ). Ideally we need information systems that can track patients over 
time and provide links between different healthcare settings and forms of treatment. 
In the longer term we need to develop metrics which can assess the holistic contri-
bution of healthcare to a person’s life, in which overall benefi ts and harm can be 
assessed and combined. This would truly be a patient centred vision in which the 
totality of healthcare was assessed not simply the disease specifi c outcomes. This is 
not going to be at all easy but is, we believe, the direction that we need to take. 
 Most of our methods of incident analysis have been restricted to relatively short 
time periods within a single hospital admission, although the basic concepts have 
proved robust in other settings such as primary care and mental health. We will have 
to expand these approaches to examine periods of care rather than a specifi c inci-
dent and its antecedents. We do not yet have fully developed methods to conduct 
safety analyses over long time periods and so new approaches will need to be devel-
oped. Initial analyses have shown that very different considerations emerge such as 
the critical role of the timing of decisions and actions in the clinical process 
(Amalberti and Brami  2012 ). These new forms of analysis will need to encompass 
a timeframe suffi cient to embrace initial assessment, provision of treatment, moni-
toring the result, and responding to complications while continuing to deliver care. 
These analyses are likely to place a much greater emphasis on the detection and 
recovery from problems in the delivery of care. 
 Patient Safety as the Management of Risk Over Time 
 We have now arrived at a rather different view of patient safety which includes, but 
does not confl ict with, defi nitions focused on the reduction of error and harm. The 
revised aim of patient safety is to maximise the overall balance of benefi t and harm 
to the patient, rather than specifi cally to reduce errors and incidents. Patient safety 
becomes the management of risk over time as the patient and family move through 
the healthcare system. The benefi t may be expressed as recovery whenever possible, 
reduction of suffering or extended survival. This is of course the aim of clinicians 
everywhere when treating individual patients but we are concerned with how this 
might be achieved across a system. 
 The reduction of harm remains important, as does the reduction in errors and 
incidents, but it is not the dominant perspective. Incidents associated with care will 
always occur during episodes of care since no human activity can be error free, 
especially across a system with open access 24 h a day and 7 days a week. Harm 
Patient Safety as the Management of Risk Over Time
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may occur because of single safety incidents but more commonly from an accumu-
lation of poor care that impedes recovery, worsens the prognosis or prolongs dis-
ability unnecessarily. Patient safety is both the art of minimizing these incidents and 
managing risk over longer time periods which will require additional skills and 
methods. We accept in this vision that errors will inevitably occur but that, in a safe 
system, very few will have any consequences for the patient. This is in essence a 
clinical vision but at the level of the system as well as the individual patient. Note 
that this view gives considerable emphasis to the achievements of patients, families 
and staff in monitoring, negotiating, adapting and recovering from the inevitable 
hazards and failures along the patient journey. 
 Adopting a Range of Safety Models 
 Safety needs to be approached very differently in different environments. We have 
initially distinguished three classes of safety models that fi t different fi eld demands: 
the adaptive model embracing risks, the high reliability model managing risks, and 
the ultra-safe model in which risk is controlled or avoided wherever possible. These 
different responses to risk give rise to different models of safety, each with their own 
advantages and limitations. The differences between these models lie in the trade- off 
between the benefi ts of adaptability and the benefi ts of standardisation and control. 
 Healthcare has many different types of activity and clinical settings and so we 
cannot use one primary model (Box  11.3 ). We can see parallels and applications of 
the three models relatively easily in the hospital environment. Radiotherapy, blood 
products, imaging systems and the management of drugs in pharmacy are all highly 
regulated, very reliable and operate to industrial standards of precision. Many of 
these systems rely on a high degree of automation and decision support and the 
professionals working in these areas are accustomed to working in a highly ordered 
manner. In other settings, such as obstetrics and elective surgery, risk has to be 
accepted and managed with coordinated teamwork. High risk surgery, trauma medi-
cine and the treatment of rare and dangerous infections require a more adaptive 
approach though all benefi t from a foundation of standard procedures. We should 
also bear in mind that much adaptation and resilience in healthcare is unnecessary 
in that it is employed not from clinical necessity but to compensate for wider system 
defi ciencies (Wears and Vincent  2013 ). 
 Box 11.3. Safety Models for Healthcare 
•  There is no one universal model of safety in healthcare that can apply 
across every setting. Each model has its own advantages, limitations and 
challenges for improvement. 
•  The choice of a safety model will derive from professional consensus, 
from real world experience, an understanding of safety and judgements as 
to what is politically feasible in the context in question. 
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 In healthcare we may fi nd we need a wider array of models than the three we 
have outlined. It would be a mistake to assume that these three broad approaches are 
all we need; they are a helpful simplifi cation of a more complex problem. For 
instance care in the community is unusual in being highly distributed amongst dif-
ferent people and organisations and also only partially reliant on strict standards. 
Many industries would manage a very distributed system by careful standardisation 
of core procedures but this may not be possible when, for instance, managing the 
care of people with severe mental health problems in the community. We are also 
aware that the industries we have chosen to illustrate the differing approaches to 
safety are high hazard, high technology and, while those who work in them support 
each other, they are not simultaneously concerned with delivering compassionate 
care to vulnerable people. We will probably need a more thoughtful approach to the 
systemic management of risk in the care of people with learning disabilities for 
instance, which will retain the broader strategic understanding but achieve the 
objective of managing risk through personal relationships as much as through for-
mal strategy. 
 We will also need to consider how we can move between models. When, for 
instance, does a previously adaptive approach become suffi ciently embedded and 
understood to begin the transition to a high reliability approach? In part this comes 
about from innovation, familiarisation and the building of expertise within a com-
munity. Innovative surgery for instance always begins in a context of risk and chal-
lenge. As experience grows in, for instance the management of aortic aneurysm, the 
surgery still carries risks but these are known, understood and managed rather than 
endured. 
 A patient’s journey crosses many medical settings and services, in different con-
texts, and therefore is necessarily exposed to the whole range of safety models. 
Controlling risk not only requires managing each setting and the transitions between 
settings, but also being alert to the fact that safety interventions that are effective in 
one setting may adversely affect safety in other contexts. For instance a cautious and 
restrictive control of laboratory services aimed at reducing error that is effective in 
raising standards locally, might adversely affect safety more widely through the 
reduction in the availability of timely laboratory results. 
 The external environment is also a critical determinant of which approach to 
safety can be adopted. An ultra-safe system relies not only on internal procedures, 
standardisation and automation but also on being able to control the external environ-
ment and working conditions. This is achieved by limiting exposure to risk, as when 
an airline grounds fl ights in bad weather, and also by controlling working conditions 
•  Imposition of a given safety model that is inappropriate to the context in 
question may not be effective and may sometimes even degrade safety. 
•  Each model has similar potential to improve safety in healthcare by a fac-
tor of 10, although the maximum attainable safety fi gures are context 
dependent and can vary considerably from one model to another. 
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so that there are, for example, strict controls on how many hours civil aviation pilots 
can fl y and how long they must rest before fl ying again. With enough resource this 
would be achievable in some areas of healthcare, and indeed some areas are already 
very safe. However if we cannot control the demand and working conditions, we 
necessarily have to rely on more adaptive approaches to safety; a different model 
may be intrinsically safer but simply not feasible in a particular context. While civil 
aviation is indeed a source of inspiration and learning such a model is only currently 
applicable in a relatively limited set of circumstances in healthcare. The approach 
taken to safety in any healthcare setting may ultimately depend in part on what is 
politically feasible which will vary by discipline, organization and jurisdiction. 
 Developing a Wider Range of Safety Strategies 
 The dominant vision of safety improvement is to increase the reliability of basic 
procedures. These might be the standard procedures in operating theatres, the pre-
vention of venous thromboembolism or procedures to minimise central line or other 
infections. A number of major interventions have shown that with suffi cient will, a 
sophisticated approach to implementation and the necessary resources, reliability 
can be markedly improved in a least a set of core processes. 
 We still have very limited safety strategies for dealing with the day to day realities 
of healthcare. The dangers to patients when staff are working in diffi cult conditions 
are sometimes discussed though generally in terms of the need for more staff which 
may, of course, be a reasonable request; if more staff were available, or their time 
was better used, then it might be possible to meet core standards. However in health-
care we will never be able to meet basic standards all the time and in all contexts. We 
need therefore to relinquish the hope that we will ever be able to do this in all circum-
stances and pose a different question. How can we ensure that care is safe, even if not 
ideal, when working conditions are diffi cult? How, for instance, should one manage 
an emergency department at times of very high workload or during major emergen-
cies when the care of some less seriously ill patients is inevitably delayed or compro-
mised. What strategies are available to a young nurse of doctor faced with an absurd 
workload, multiple competing demands and many sick patients? People do adapt and 
cope of course, but on an individual basis rather than with a considered team based 
strategy. Developing considered approaches to the management of risk in such situ-
ations is a priority for the next phase of patient safety (Box  11.4 ). 
 Box 11.4. Developing a Wider Range of Safety Strategies 
•  We should extend our safety strategies to include risk control, monitoring 
and adaptation, and mitigation 
•  We must not be ashamed to propose strategies that aim to manage risk 
rather than optimise care as long as the fi nal result is benefi cial to the 
patient and robust to context. 
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 We also need to consider how best to customise specifi c safety interventions. For 
example reviews of studies of interventions to reduce falls have provided confl icting 
evidence of effectiveness – some studies showed strong effects, others none. Frances 
Healey and colleagues argued that the confl ict is only apparent and due to the fact 
that two very different kinds of interventions have been tested; some trials adopted 
a one size-fi ts-all implementation of a set bundle of procedures while others, in 
contrast, developed an individualized approach to each patient with responsive care 
planning and post-fall review. The standard intervention has been shown in large 
randomized controlled trials to have little effect; the more personalized approach, 
which stresses an adaptive response to risk, is proving very much more effective. 
Healey comments that this ‘makes complete sense in the context of falls risk being 
a complex combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors and personal attitudes to 
risk, in an acute environment where physical condition and therefore falls risk fac-
tors are rapidly changing’ (Healey et al.  2014 and personal communication 2015). 
 A Compendium of Safety Strategies 
 We have proposed fi ve broad safety strategies each associated with a family of inter-
ventions. We have provided illustrations of how each strategy might be applied in 
hospital, home and primary care. The reality is no doubt considerably more compli-
cated and needs to be further explored. But even now, with incomplete understanding, 
we can set out a suite of potential interventions to improve safety and manage risk.
 Table  11.1 brings together many of the strategies and interventions described in 
previous chapters and offers some comments on their applicability, current use and 
challenges for implementation. The strategies and interventions can operate at dif-
ferent levels and have divided these into frontline, organisation and system levels. 
This is not a complete account by any means as, for one thing, we have not included 
patients and families as users of these approaches. However it makes the general 
point that some interventions are more useful on the frontline while others are more 
useful at system level. Care bundles for instance are a frontline team intervention, 
although managers and regulators may encourage and even mandate their use. Risk 
control approaches can be used within a clinical team in deciding not to start an 
operation unless all the equipment is available. However, most risk control interven-
tions, such as restricting demand or controlling working conditions, will be at 
organisation or system level and require considerable authority to implement. To be 
effective of course they also need the backing of frontline staff. 
•  Developing and implementing considered team based responses to diffi cult 
working conditions will be safer than relying on ad hoc improvisation 
•  Healthcare uses a very limited set of safety interventions. The limited 
progress in patient safety is partly due to the underuse of the available 
strategies and interventions. It is like driving a car and only using fi rst gear. 
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 We realise that these proposals are just a starting point in that considerable work 
is needed to map and articulate the full range of strategies and interventions that are 
currently in use and which might be adopted. This has been done for ‘best practice’ 
approaches, and to some extent for interventions to improve the system. But we 
need a much fuller description of all types of strategy and intervention if we are to 
develop a truly comprehensive approach to safety. 
 We can point to similar developments in other fi elds which may serve as a model 
for how this might be done. There is, for instance, enormous interest in infl uencing 
the behaviour of people in a variety of ways; these include diet, smoking, exercise, 
road safety, the payment of taxes and a host of other policy objectives. There are 
numerous psychological and social theories which purport to explain changes in 
human behaviour through a variety of mechanisms each with implications for inter-
vention. In weight loss for instance one might seek to enhance self-esteem as a 
means of increasing adherence to a diet or place more emphasis on extrinsic motiva-
tions such as offering fi nancial incentives (Box  11.5 ). Susan Michie and colleagues 
have developed the Behaviour Change Wheel (BCW), a synthesis of 19 frameworks 
of behaviour change found in the research literature (Michie et al.  2013 ). The BCW 
has at its core a model of behaviour known as COM-B standing for capability, 
opportunity, motivation and behaviour. The BCW identifi es different intervention 
options that can be applied to changing each of the components and policies that can 
be adopted to deliver those intervention options. 
 Changing behaviour is of course one way of managing risk, particularly in 
respect of adherence to safety critical procedures. However, in this context, we are 
drawing a broader parallel with the strategic approach to classifying, interpreting 
and designing interventions. Michie and colleagues point, as we do, to the plethora 
of potential interventions, to the fact that most interventions are used singly or in 
limited combinations. Their approach has been to draw out the distinguishing fea-
tures of each approach, to classify and integrate in a broad conceptual framework of 
behaviour change interventions. 
 Box 11.5. Contrasting Approaches to Changing Risky Behaviour 
 Suppose one wished to reduce the propensity of young drivers to engage in 
risky driving practices such as driving too fast. One would canvass all the 
options including improving their ‘capability’ to read the road and adjust their 
driving to the conditions, restricting their ‘opportunity’ to drive recklessly by 
means of speed limiters or speed humps, and establishing whether a promis-
ing approach would be to try to change their ‘motivation’ to drive safely 
through mass media campaigns or legislation and enforcement. Any or all of 
these may have some effect. The Behaviour Change Wheel provides a sys-
tematic way of determining which options are most likely to achieve the 
change required. 
 Adapted from Michie et al. ( 2014 ) 
11 A Compendium of Safety Strategies and Interventions
149
 Our ‘incomplete taxonomy’ is a fi rst step towards a similar initiative in the sys-
temic management of risk in healthcare and potentially in other settings. We now 
need to map the landscape, assess the distinctive assumptions and approach of each 
strategy and intervention and begin to consider how to customise and combine the 
interventions to the challenges facing us. At the moment, in most cases, we are only 
using a fraction of the potential interventions open to us. Drawing on the full range 
and intervening at all levels of the system would give us much more leverage and 
power in confronting the challenges of keeping healthcare safe in a time of austerity 
and rising demand. 
 Key Points 
•  There are fi ve major transitions between the current vision of patient safety 
and the broader one we need for the future. 
•  Our current approach to patient safety assumes generally high quality 
healthcare punctuated by occasional safety incidents and adverse events; 
this as a vision of safety from the perspective of healthcare professionals. 
We need to also understand risk and harm through the patient’s eyes 
•  Viewing safety through the patient’s eyes has the immediate consequence 
that we need to view safety in the context of the patient journey. This 
means that we need to examine episodes of care and consider both benefi t 
and harm within an extended timescale. 
•  Patient safety is the art of minimizing incidents but also managing risk 
over longer time periods which will require additional skills and methods. 
We accept in this vision that errors will inevitably occur but that, in a safe 
system, very few will have any consequences for the patient. 
•  Safety needs to be approached very differently in different environments. 
Healthcare has many different types of activity and clinical settings and so 
we cannot use one primary model. 
•  We need to develop a wider range of safety strategies and interventions. 
We should extend our safety strategies to include risk control, monitoring 
and adaptation, and mitigation 
•  We have very limited safety strategies for dealing with the day to day reali-
ties of healthcare. People adapt and cope, but on an individual basis rather 
than with a considered team based strategy. Developing considered 
approaches to the management of risk in such situations is a priority for the 
next phase of patient safety. 
•  A compendium of safety strategies and interventions is already available. 
The slow progress in patient safety is in part due to the fact that we are not 
using the full range of interventions available. It is like driving a car using 
only fi rst gear. 
•  Considerable work is needed to map and articulate the full range of strate-
gies and interventions that are currently in use and which might be adopted. 
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